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INTRODUCTION
In an October 2013 term featuring epic clashes over separation of
powers, high-tech search and seizure, the federal treaty power, and
freedom of religion, few paid much attention to an obscure standing
case. That case, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
1
Components, Inc., concerned the parties entitled to bring suit for
2
false advertising under the Lanham Act. In the course of resolving
that question, however, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
questioned the longstanding doctrine of “prudential” standing. What
the Court actually did in Lexmark was unsurprising, and its analysis
was not at bottom all that different from what courts had done for
some time. But the majority’s discussion may spur far-reaching
changes in how lawyers think and (especially) talk about standing.
I. JUSTICE SCALIA’S TREATISE ON PRUDENTIAL STANDING
Lexmark was a case about laser-printer toner—the powdery ink
that normally runs out right at the moment when one needs to print
an important document for filing. Toner cartridges are expensive, and
a considerable business has grown up around the refurbishment and
resale of used cartridges. Lexmark sought to reserve this business to
itself by requiring its customers to return used cartridges to it. Static
Control, however, invented a microchip that enabled other companies
3
to refurbish Lexmark’s cartridges. Lexmark sued Static Control
Copyright © 2014 Ernest A. Young
 Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 2015).
3. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1384.
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under federal copyright laws; Static Control counterclaimed under the
Lanham Act, arguing that Lexmark had falsely advised its customers
that Static Control’s chip was illegal and that it was therefore illegal
4
to go to non-Lexmark remanufacturers for refurbishment. Lexmark
moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that Static Control
lacked standing to bring a claim under the Act; the remanufacturers
themselves, Static Control contended, would be a more direct
5
plaintiff. The Court granted certiorari to determine “the appropriate
analytical framework for determining a party’s standing to maintain
6
an action for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”
Federal Courts professors traditionally have taught standing as
including two sets of components—constitutional and prudential. The
“‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,’” deriving from
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, demands that “[t]he
plaintiff must have suffered or be imminently threatened with a
concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ that is fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a
7
favorable judicial decision.” Lexmark conceded, and the Court
agreed, that “Static Control’s allegations of lost sales and damage to
its business reputation give it standing under Article III to press its
8
false-advertising claim.” Debate thus focused on the second,
“prudential” aspect of standing doctrine. That aspect has included
three general requirements: “the general prohibition on a litigant’s
raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law
9
invoked.” These limitations have long been thought to “fit within a
wide array of traditional doctrines of judicial self-governance, such as
10
equitable discretion, abstention, and forum non conveniens.”

4. Id.
5. Id. at 1835.
6. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (No.
12-837), 2013 WL 166412, at *i.).
7. Id. at 1386 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see
generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 113–27
(6th ed. 2009).
8. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
9. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
10. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 128.
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Because they do not derive (at least directly) from Article III, the
prudential rules can be overridden by broad legislative grants of
11
standing to sue.
Lexmark, however, called this structure into question. Finding the
label of prudential standing “misleading,” Justice Scalia undertook to
12
“clarify[] the nature of the question at issue in this case.” He noted
that prudential standing has always been in tension with the principle
that “a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its
13
jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.” He might well have added that
prudential standing doctrines are often challenged as judge-made law,
14
existing in Griswoldian “penumbras” of Article III. In any event,
Scalia noted that the aspect of prudence at issue in Lexmark—the
“zone-of-interests” test—has always been concerned with Congress’s
15
intent in enacting the law in question. The Court quoted Judge
Silberman’s observation that “prudential standing is a misnomer” in
zone-of-interest cases, because the doctrine inquires whether “this
particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive
16
statute.”
Setting aside the “prudential standing” rubric, Justice Scalia
concluded that
the question this case presents is whether Static Control falls
within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue
under § 1125(a). In other words, we ask whether Static Control has
a cause of action under the statute. That question requires us to

11. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998).
12. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386.
13. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.
Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).
14. Justice Scalia made just that point in a well-known law review article over three
decades ago. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 885 (1983). For a more recent version of the
criticism, see S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 95, 116
(2014).
15. The Court has sometimes applied zone-of-interest-like analysis to constitutional
provisions. It has held, for example, that the Fourth Amendment generally protects the privacy
interests of the owner of a property but often does not extend to her guests. See, e.g., Minnesota
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89–91 (1998). Persons other than the property owner, in other words,
often fall outside the Amendment’s zone of interests. Debate about whether corporations have
standing to invoke provisions like the First Amendment also fall into this category. See, e.g.,
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Analysis in such cases has generally focused not on
general principles of standing but rather on the substantive content and intent of the provision
at issue—much as in the statutory cases.
16. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 (alteration in original) (quoting Ass’n of Battery
Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concurring opinion)).
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determine the meaning of the congressionally enacted provision
creating a cause of action. In doing so, we apply traditional
principles of statutory interpretation. . . . Just as a court cannot
apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of
action that Congress has denied . . . it cannot limit a cause of action
17
that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.

Despite reframing this as a statutory question rather than one of
“prudential standing,” the Court applied the same “zone of interests”
analysis that it had pursued in prior cases, asking whether Static
Control fell “within the zone of interests protected by the law
18
invoked.” The Court found rather easily that it did, noting that
“Static Control’s alleged injuries—lost sales and damage to its
business reputation—are injuries to precisely the sorts of commercial
19
interests the Act protects.” The Court also inquired—apparently as a
second element of construing the scope of the Act’s cause of action—
whether Static Control’s injuries were “proximately caused by
20
violations of the statute.” Static Control satisfied this test as well,
even though it was not the direct target of Lexmark’s allegedly false
representation. Having alleged “that it designed, manufactured, and
sold microchips that both (1) were necessary for, and (2) had no other
use than, refurbishing Lexmark toner cartridges,” it followed “that
any false advertising that reduced the remanufacturers’ business
21
necessarily injured Static Control as well.”
Lexmark was unanimous as to both result and rationale. With
respect to the result, the case seems relatively straightforward; the
interesting questions arise from the Court’s explicit shift away from
the traditional rubric of prudential standing. That shift raises a
number of questions that are likely to bedevil the lower courts.
II. STANDING QUESTIONS AFTER LEXMARK
Writing in 1988, Professor (now judge) William Fletcher
reinterpreted standing doctrine as grounded in the substance of the
plaintiff’s claim—not in general principles emanating from Article
22
III. “Standing,” Fletcher wrote, “should simply be a question on the
17. Id. at 1387–88 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001), on the
illegitimacy of courts creating new causes of action).
18. Id. at 1388 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
19. Id. at 1393.
20. Id. at 1390–91.
21. Id. at 1394.
22. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988). For a recent
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merits of plaintiff’s claim;” hence, “[t]he essence of a true standing
question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right to
23
judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty?” It followed that
“[t]his question should be seen as a question of substantive law,
answerable by reference to the statutory or constitutional provision
24
whose protection is invoked.” Fletcher urged that this inquiry should
replace the traditional constitutional requirements courts had found
in Article III, such as injury-in-fact, and that position remains heresy
at the Supreme Court. But one may fairly read Lexmark as adopting
Fletcher’s analysis for purposes of prudential standing. The thrust of
Justice Scalia’s opinion, after all, is to replace general, judge-made
notions of prudence with a substantive inquiry into the intent of
particular statutory provisions.
This is a significant shift in how the Court talks about standing. It
is likely to raise a number of questions.
A. Will Lexmark Govern Other Aspects of Prudential Standing?
As already noted, the zone-of-interests test upon which the Court
focused in Lexmark has always been a question of the substantive
intent behind the particular legal provision forming the basis of the
plaintiff’s underlying claim. As such, Judge Fletcher’s substantive
vision of standing is a natural fit for the zone-of-interests doctrine. It
is less clear, however, how that vision can apply to more general
principles, such as the general prohibition on third-party standing or
the bar to generalized grievances. These, after all, have been seen as
generally-applicable requirements.
The Court addressed these other aspects of traditional prudential
25
standing in a footnote. Justice Scalia suggested that cases raising
“generalized grievances” are actually “barred for constitutional
26
reasons, not ‘prudential’ ones.” That statement arguably overlooked
27
cases like FEC v. Akins, in which the Court seemed to suggest that
the constitutional “concrete injury” and the prudential “no
generalized grievances” principles were related but distinct. Akins
rejected a prudential challenge to standing on the ground that
symposium on this seminal article, see Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25:
Introduction to the Symposium, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269 (2013).
23. Id. at 223, 229.
24. Id. at 229.
25. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3.
26. Id.
27. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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Congress had specifically conferred a statutory right to sue on the
28
plaintiff, thereby obviating any prudential hurdles to standing. It
nonetheless considered the Government’s argument that plaintiff had
only a “generalized grievance,” noting that the precedents
inconsistently referred to this objection in (sometimes) constitutional
29
and (sometimes) prudential terms. In considering this argument,
however, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion focused on whether the
30
plaintiff’s injury was too “abstract” —a requirement more in keeping
with the constitutional notion of “concrete injury.” That would seem
to leave room for a prudential principle of “generalized grievance”
that, as the Court said in Warth v. Seldin, comes into play “when the
asserted harm is . . . shared in substantially equal measure by all or a
31
large class of citizens.” To complicate matters further, Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Akins focused not on whether the plaintiff’s injury was
“concrete” but rather upon whether it is “undifferentiated” from the
32
injury shared by many others. But again, this would leave room for a
prudential category of “generalized grievance”—not at issue in
Akins—for injuries that are simply widely shared.
Prior to Lexmark, then, one could plausibly view the
constitutional “concrete injury” requirement and the prudential bar
on “generalized grievances” as protecting similar values, but to
different degrees. Both were designed to prevent the courts from
intervening in broad controversies better suited to the political
branches. But the recognition of a constitutional core within a
prudential penumbra allowed Congress flexibility to permit claims by
a broad class of persons so long as their injuries were sufficiently
concrete. Justice Scalia’s more recent comment in Lexmark is plainly
dictum, but it strongly suggests that there may simply be no more
“generalized grievance” rule distinct from the constitutional
minimum of a “concrete injury.”
The Court admitted, however, that “[t]he limitations on thirdparty standing are harder to classify,” although it pointed out that
prior cases had seen third-party standing as “closely related to the
28. See id. at 19.
29. See id. at 23.
30. See id. at 23–24.
31. 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
32. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia pointed out that when
many people suffer similar injuries in a mass tort—physical burns, for example—each person’s
injury is differentiated and particular to them, even if others suffer similar harm. See id.
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question whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of
33
action on the claim.” A line of cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
treat third-party issues just this way: In asking whether beneficiaries
of a federal spending condition may enforce that condition by a
private suit against state or local officials, the Court has explicitly
imported its analysis of private rights of action from Alexander v.
34
35
Sandoval and similar cases. These cases suggest third-party standing
issues can likewise be handled as issues primarily of Congress’s intent
with respect to particular statutory schemes.
What about the Court’s more exotic prudential rules? In Elk
36
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, for example, the Court
held that the father of a student in public school lacked standing to
challenge the school district’s policy of reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance to open each school day. The trouble was that the child’s
mother—who had sole legal custody under state law—opposed the
suit and argued that it would undermine the child’s best interests. This
precluded the father from suing as his daughter’s “next friend” and
forced him to rely on an injury to his own right to inculcate his
atheistic beliefs in his child. The extent of that right was murky in this
circumstance, however, given the mother’s conflicting prerogatives
37
and the possible threat to the child’s best interests. Not entirely
surprisingly, the Court punted, holding that “it is improper for the
federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue
is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution
of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the
38
source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Newdow criticized the
majority for recognizing a “novel prudential standing principle”
39
applicable to cases touching on domestic relations. The case may be
better read, however, as an acknowledgment that despite the
crystallization of particular prudential standing doctrines—such as the
zone-of-interests test or the third-party rule—the courts retain a more
33. 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721
(1990)).
34. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
35. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329 (1997); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 7, at 968–69.
36. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
37. See id. at 13–17.
38. Id. at 17.
39. Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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general discretion to dismiss cases on case-specific prudential
40
grounds. In Newdow, those grounds included a federalism-based
respect for the state’s primary authority over the crucial family law
41
principles involved, as well as the imperative to avoid decision of a
42
difficult constitutional question under the Religion Clauses.
Whatever one thinks of cases like Newdow, it is impossible to
assimilate them either to questions of congressional intent (as
Lexmark did with zone of interests and as might be done for thirdparty standing) or to the constitutional requirement of a “case or
controversy.” And for reasons I explore further below, the Court is
unlikely to abandon prudential reasoning altogether.
B. Has the Court Created a New Rule of Prudential Standing?
Traditional accounts of prudential standing feature three general
requirements: (1) the rule against third-party standing; (2) the
prohibition on generalized grievances; and (3) the zone-of-interests
test. The Court has occasionally come up with additional, more
particularistic principles, such as Newdow’s rule against conferring
43
standing where it would interfere with principles of state family law.
But the Court’s treatment of proximate causation in Lexmark seemed
to recognize a principle of general applicability that had not been part
of the Court’s prudential standing doctrine. Justice Scalia wrote that
“we generally presume that a statutory cause of action is limited to
plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the
statute.” This principle, he said, “has been ‘a well established principle
of [the common] law” “[f]or centuries,” and it is part of the legal
44
background against which Congress is presumed to legislate.
40. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985)
(distinguishing between judicial discretion to adopt general rules limiting jurisdiction and caseby-case discretion not to hear particular cases).
41. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12–13 (majority opinion) (noting, inter alia, the “‘domestic
relations exception’ that ‘divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees’”) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).
42. See id. at 17 (“When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the
outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to
resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.”).
43. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); see also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 128.
44. Lexmark Inter’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390
(alteration in original) (quoting Waters v. Merchants’ Louisville Ins. Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213,
223 (1837)). For an empirical study assessing the extent to which Members of Congress and
their staff actually know and rely on such background principles, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa
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This is hardly an outlandish requirement, and the Court did not
apply it particularly strictly in Lexmark. But the Court had never
mentioned it before as a part of prudential standing doctrine. Neither
does it feature prominently in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning
the existence and scope of private rights of action under federal
statutes. That jurisprudence, in its permissive days, focused on the
statute’s underlying policy; nowadays, in a more restrictive vein, it
45
looks to statutory text. Only time will tell whether the Court’s
identification of proximate causation as a generally applicable limit
on federal statutory causes of action will provide a new line of attack
for defendants.
The Lexmark Court’s treatment of proximate causation does
suggest that the Court may hang onto the notion of general rules of
non-constitutional standing—whether it calls them “prudential” or
not. The trouble with an approach grounded entirely in Congress’s
substantive intent with respect to particular statutes is that that intent
is frequently opaque or nonexistent. Congress frequently does not
specify exactly whom it wishes to be able to sue, even when it
expressly creates a private right of action. In such cases, most of the
work of interpretation will be done by default rules—general
presumptions concerning what Congress would have wanted if it had
46
confronted the problem explicitly. Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Lexmark characterized its proximate causation analysis in just this
way: “Congress, we assume, is familiar with the common-law rule
[limiting plaintiffs to those whose injuries are proximately caused by
47
the legal violation] and does not mean to displace it sub silentio.”
The requirement of proximate causation thus functions as a general
rule of non-constitutional standing applicable across statutory
48
schemes, unless Congress specifically displaces it.
Ironically, the Court’s discussion of proximate causation in
Lexmark may have the unintended consequence of loosening the
causation element of constitutional standing. Article III requires not

Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725
(2014).
45. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 705–07.
46. See Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge Fletcher—And of General Standing Principles,
65 ALA. L. REV. 473, 481 (2013).
47. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390.
48. See generally Young, supra note 46 (arguing that not all standing rules can be derived
from the underlying statutes or other legal norms sued upon in particular cases).
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only a concrete injury in fact, but that this injury be “fairly traceable”
49
to the challenged conduct and “redressable” by the requested relief.
Both of these elements fall under the rubric of causation—traceability
is causation running backward from the plaintiff’s injury to the
challenged conduct, while redressability is causation running forward
from a judicial order ending the case to the remediation of the
original injury. In Lexmark, Justice Scalia commented that
“[p]roximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing,
which requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the
50
defendant’s conduct.” That statement strongly suggests what might
not otherwise have occurred to most observers, which is that the
Article III causation standard must be something kinder and gentler
to plaintiffs than proximacy.
C. Will the Court’s Restrictive Implied Rights of Action Jurisprudence
Creep into the Zone-of-Interests Analysis?
Lexmark’s analysis of whether Static Control’s claim fits within
the Lanham Act’s zone of interests was fairly conventional. What was
new was the Court’s relocation of zone-of-interest analysis from an
aspect of standing to a question of the scope of the plaintiff’s
underlying cause of action. That relocation will be of interest
primarily to academics—unless and until it turns out to affect the
test’s application.
There is some reason to think that it might. In particular, the
Court’s analysis of private rights of action has become increasingly
strict in recent years. The Court has imposed a virtual moratorium on
51
the recognition of new implied rights of action, repeatedly refused to
expand the scope of previously-recognized implied rights under both
52
federal statutes and the Constitution, and even extended its
49. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
50. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391 n.6.
51. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at
705–11.
52. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 190–91 (1994) (rejecting calls to extend the implied private right of action under SEC
Rule 10b–5 to aiders and abettors); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 165 (2008) (observing that “[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of
action caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress,
not for us”); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012) (rejecting an effort to extend Bivens
to cover an Eighth Amendment claim against employees of a privately operated federal prison);
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (rejecting a request to extend Bivens to cover
harassment and intimidation of the plaintiff by the Bureau of Land Management); see generally
Corr. Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (noting that since 1980, the Court has
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restrictive approach to express statutory causes of action. If future
development of the zone-of-interests test takes place in this
environment, that test may well be construed more restrictively.
Significantly, the Lexmark Court confined the import of prior
statements that the zone-of-interests test is “not especially
demanding” to claims brought under the Administrative Procedure
Act and emphasized that “the breadth of the zone of interests varies
54
according to the provisions of law at issue.” This language strongly
implied that the Court might not be so generous in other contexts—as
55
did its earlier citation to Alexander v. Sandoval, the Rehnquist
Court’s leading decision cutting back on implied rights of action.
D. What Other Effects Will Making Prudential Standing Concerns
Part of the Merits Have?
The Lexmark opinion identified one important effect of relocating
the concerns previously considered under prudential standing to
become part of substantive analysis of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Justice Scalia noted that “the absence of a valid (as opposed to
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to
56
adjudicate the case.” This has a number of important effects.
Procedurally, a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on zone-ofinterests arguments should rest on Federal Rule 12(b)(6), not
12(b)(1), which deals with lack of jurisdiction. As a non-jurisdictional
argument, zone of interests may not be raised at any point in the
litigation, but must be timely advanced like other merits contentions.
And while courts may not employ “hypothetical standing” to avoid a
difficult Article III question by resolving the case on an easier merits
57
argument, they will be able to postpone consideration of zone of
interests (and possibly other prudential standing-type arguments) in
this way.

“consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of
defendants”).
53. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth.
v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 968–72.
54. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012), and Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 163 (1997)).
55. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (cited at 134 S. Ct. at 1388).
56. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002).
57. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
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Perhaps a more surprising consequence would affect federal
causes of action litigated in state court. Prudential standing, after all,
has generally been justified as part of the federal courts’ inherent
authority to control litigation of cases that come before them, as well
as a penumbra-like outgrowth of Article III itself. That sort of
principle would, of course, be limited to federal court; state courts are
not subject either to Article III or the inherent authority of federal
judges. And many states have taken advantage of this fact to offer
broader standing rules that, for example, permit questions of public
import to be more readily litigated by a broader class of parties or
58
even served up for advisory opinions.
If principles previously considered part of prudential standing—
like zone of interests or the restriction on third parties—are instead
part of the underlying federal cause of action, then they are
substantive law binding on the state courts. Plainly, if Lexmark had
come out the other way on the merits, no state court would have been
free to hear Sonic Control’s counterclaim on the theory that its state
law took a broader view of standing. The claim would simply not have
59
been actionable under the Lanham Act, in any forum. Questions
might also arise whether state courts may take a narrower view of
standing in areas previously thought to be governed by prudential
principles. After all, state courts generally may not decline to hear
60
federal claims under the rule of Testa v. Katt. It is possible that a
state’s restrictive standing rules might be considered a generally61
applicable “valid excuse”—a longstanding exception to Testa —but
this is far from certain. And state court rulings on questions like the
zone of interests covered by federal statutes will now be appealable to
the U.S. Supreme Court.

58. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 126–27.
59. One might still raise such a claim if the federal-law violation could be incorporated as
an element in a state-law cause of action. Cf. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986) (involving a state-law tort claim employing violation of a federal regulatory standard
to establish the element of fault).
60. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
61. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 449–
50 (discussing the “valid excuse” doctrine).

YOUNG FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

10/21/2015 2:27 PM

PRUDENTIAL STANDING AFTER LEXMARK

161

E. Will the Court’s Aversion to Prudential Rules Extend Beyond
Standing?
Critics of the prudential standing doctrines frequently assert that
“a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its
62
jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.” The canonical “unflagging
obligation” language first appeared in Colorado River Conservation
63
District v. United States, but the general idea traces much further
back to Chief Justice Marshall’s even-more-canonical statement in
Cohens v. Virginia that “[w]e have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
64
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”
Yet the pedigree of these statements is highly instructive. Colorado
River is a famous abstention case in which the federal courts declined
65
to exercise their jurisdiction. And Cohens is a sovereign immunity
case, construing a principle that deprives federal courts of jurisdiction
in a wide variety of circumstances (and which is notoriously difficult
66
to square with the constitutional text). If the federal courts’
jurisdictional obligations are to be truly “unflagging,” a great deal of
established doctrine will have to go besides prudential standing.
Consider, for example, the other justiciability doctrines besides
standing. Although the Supreme Court has grounded the ripeness
67
requirement in Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement,
ripeness generally turns on a flexible inquiry concerning “the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
68
withholding court consideration.” These factors derive in part from
equitable considerations and are largely prudential in nature;
moreover, the Court has suggested that some ripeness concerns may
69
be overridden by statutes directing speedy adjudication.
Similarly, although the mootness doctrine has been aptly
described as inquiring whether the plaintiff retains the concrete injury
62. Lexmark Inter’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).
See also Brown, supra note 14, at 100.
63. 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
64. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403 (1821).
65. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 806; see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at
1135–40.
66. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 878–85.
67. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
68. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
69. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976).
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that gave him standing when the case was filed, it likewise
incorporates significant prudential elements. Important exceptions to
the mootness doctrine turn on prudential concerns about the conduct
of litigation, such as the need to permit adjudication of claims that
71
expire quickly or to facilitate resolution of claims on a class-wide
72
basis. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed almost three decades ago,
“[t]he logical conclusion to be drawn from these cases, and from the
historical development of the principle of mootness, is that while an
unwillingness to decide moot cases may be connected to the case or
controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated connection
that may be overridden where there are strong reasons to override
73
it.”
Mootness and ripeness are both, in other words, mostly prudential
in nature. Nor are they the only other examples where the federal
courts have found their obligation to decide cases within their
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to be, well, flagging. The
various abstention doctrines permit or require federal courts to defer
to state courts in various contexts, based on considerations of comity,
74
federalism, constitutional avoidance, and judicial efficiency. The act
of state doctrine, which prevents domestic courts from reviewing the
legality of an official act of a foreign government within its own
territory, rests largely on prudential concerns about judicial
75
interference with the foreign policy of the political branches. Federal
70. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE
L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973) (characterizing mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness)”).
71. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (recognizing an exception where an
issue is “capable of repetition, yet evading review”); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us by the case
or controversy requirement of Art. III itself, we would have no more power to decide lawsuits
which are ‘moot’ but which also raise questions which are capable of repetition but evading
review than we would to decide cases which are ‘moot’ but raise no such questions.”).
72. See, e.g., U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
73. Honig, 484 U.S. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
74. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
(requiring abstention where parallel state and federal litigation would massively waste
resources); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (requiring federal courts to abstain to avoid
interference with pending state criminal proceedings); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941) (requiring abstention where an unsettled question of federal constitutional law
may be avoided depending on the resolution, by a state court, of an unsettled state law
question).
75. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see generally Ernest A.
Young, The Story of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: Federal Judicial Power in Foreign
Relations Cases, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 415, 436–38 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik
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courts have asserted discretion to create exceptions to Congress’s
general provision for subject matter jurisdiction over cases “arising
under” federal law, based on prudential judgments about the strength
76
of federal interests and the likely impact on federal caseloads. And
the federal courts routinely dismiss habeas corpus petitions filed by
state prisoners who have failed to present their claims to the state
courts, notwithstanding that such dismissals rest on prudential
77
concerns about federalism rather than jurisdictional restrictions.
It is highly doubtful that all of this doctrine is to go by the wayside
in the wake of Lexmark. Judges have always formulated rules for the
decision of cases that constrain their powers more narrowly than
external sources—constitutional and statutory jurisdictional
provisions—would permit. But if that is true, then the Court will need
to explain why its concerns about judge-made prudential rules are
more pressing in some areas than in others. Justice Scalia was surely
right to ground the zone-of-interests doctrine more squarely in
Congress’s intent, and that no doubt explains Lexmark’s unanimity.
One strongly suspects that a general assault on other prudential
doctrines, such as the ones noted above, would prove considerably
more controversial.
CONCLUSION
One is tempted to suggest that Scalia’s “clarifying” discussion of
standing in Lexmark has done precisely the opposite. That would be
unfair, however. Ever since Judge Fletcher’s seminal article, it has
been an open secret of standing law that standing is not—as the Court
frequently protests—entirely divorced from the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims. By acknowledging that fact, at least with respect to
prudential standing, Lexmark does hold out hope of placing standing
doctrine generally on a firmer footing. At the same time, the Court
will need to recognize that it cannot do without prudential rules
entirely. Then the hard work of specifying which prudential rules are
legitimate, which are not, and why can begin.

eds., 2010) (comparing act of state to other prudential doctrines). Like other prudential
doctrines, the act of state principle can be overridden by statute. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C.A. § 2370
(West 2015).
76. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
77. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 7, at 1281–83.

